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What is important in the present context, however, is that simple foreknowl-
edge, foreknowledge without middle knowledge, is not sufficient to enable 
God to be perfectly provident. Indeed, I claim to have shown that simple 
foreknowledge is of no use whatever for the doctrine of providence.8 Simple 
foreknowledge provides God with knowledge of what will actually occur, 
but this knowledge, which is subsequent to God's own decision about what 
he will himself do, cannot then be used to guide that decision. And thus we 
obtain an important result: Those who wish to combine a libertarian concep-
tion of free will with a strong doctrine of providence must embrace middle 
knowledge. Those who affirm simple foreknowledge but deny middle knowl-
edge are very likely to find themselves with a doctrine of foreknowledge 
which is theologically useless. 
Freddoso's work on Molina is indispensable. It is an outstanding contribu-
tion to the literature on divine foreknowledge, and by far the best thing 
produced to date on middle knowledge. Those who work on either of these 
topics will overlook it to their own great loss. 
NOTES 
1. See, ~Foreknowledge and Necessity," Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985), pp. 121-57; 
~A Refutation of Middle Knowledge," Nous 20 (1986), pp. 545-57; and God, Time, and 
Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), Chapters 2 and 4-7. 
2. Alfred I. Freddoso, ~Accidental Necessity and Logical Detenninism," Journal of 
Philosophy 80 (1983), pp. 257-78. 
3. See Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 
123. 
4. Strictly speaking, what is new here is that accidental necessity is not closed under 
entailmentfor contingent propositions; on Freddoso's explication, necessary propositions 
cannot in any case be accidentally necessary. 
5. See, MForeknowledge and Necessity," pp. 142-44, and God, Time, and Knowledge, 
pp.104-15. 
6. This point is argued in God. Time, and Knowledge, pp. 32-35. 
7. Personal communication. 
8. See, God, Time. and Knowledge, Chapter 3. 
The Reality of Time and The Existence of God, by David Braine. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988. Pp. XVI, 383. Cloth. 
DAVID BURRELL, C.S.C., University of Notre Dame. 
In a challenging and penetrating inquiry, this philosopher from Aberdeen 
develops a sustained argument whereby the world in which we live assumes 
its rightfully primary place, and it is this world's continuing into the future 
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which provides the impetus for his proof that God exists. Josef Pieper once 
remarked that the "hidden element in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas" is 
the fact of creation. Braine may be seen to be elucidating that remark by 
making explicit the connections between key assertions of Aquinas' synthe-
sis: the eternity of God and the reality of time, the centrality of a real dis-
tinction between essence and esse, such that the resulting composition of 
creatures demands a simple (or incomposite) cause of their existence, leading 
to a relation of creator to creation of such immediacy that all temptation to 
deism is removed "when, in one move, we at once mark the unlikeness in 
God's way of existing from the way creatures exist and mark this immediacy" 
(20). 
My reference to Aquinas is intended as an orientation; one should not be 
misled into labelling Braine's effort as "Thomist," for the arguments he gives 
are his own, exhibiting a sophisticated grasp of key elements in philosophy 
of science, as well as logic and semantics. Yet he manages to catch thereby 
the heart of Aquinas' affirmation of a temporal world freely created by an 
eternal God, showing just how wrongheaded it is to caricature Aquinas' 
articulation as "classical theism"-Le., an irreligious substitution of philo-
sophical categories for the fresh perspectives of revelation, and therefore a 
position which must be overcome, on theological if not philosophical 
grounds. Quite the contrary, Braine argues: unless some such articulation of 
creation in relation to its creator is allowed to inform one's theological in-
quiry, the delicate harmony between free creatures and a sovereign God is 
bound to be jeopardized-as the history of theology amply demonstrates. In 
fact, one of the strongest recommendations of Braine's study is his knowl-
edgeable sensitivity to theological issues throughout, particularly in his re-
current application of logical and semantic results to Trinitarian doctrine. One 
might also see his resolute upholding of the primacy of "first order" philo-
sophical results and the world of existing substances as reflecting a similar 
theological sensitivity: the only world we know is the one in which we and 
other things subsist; other "worlds" are conceptually parasitic on this one, 
the one which God creates and sustains. 
The focus implies the "reality of time": while substances exist in a causal 
matrix wherein their activity is causally displayed, the now of existence and 
activity (which he dubs the "dramatic now" [47]) itself provides no reason 
for their continuing in existence. Such a claim does not entail "occasional-
ism," though it indicates why theists bereft of the conceptual tools needed to 
distinguish existing from essence might feel constrained to evacuate natural 
causal efficacy in the face of a sovereign creator. For Braine, as for Aquinas, 
natures reliably continue yet their actual continuance requires a non-temporal 
cause of their existing (340). Such is the nub of his proof that a first cause 
of the universe must exist, so the early chapters are spent securing a viable 
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notion of temporal existence, and the latter chapters enhancing the notion of 
first cause of existence so that it can be recognizable to Jews, Christians, and 
Muslims as their God. And throughout, his astute methodological comments 
keep reminding the reader how doing philosophy of religion requires a clear 
perspective on and accurate use of many subdisciplines of philosophy. 
God's eternity and the "dramatic now" of temporal existence will be seen 
to complement one another once one assumes a resolutely (Aristotelian) "first 
order" philosophical stance, wherein existing things exhibit their activity via 
causal efficacy. And the activity stems from their actual existing, which must 
itself flow from an eternal cause, where 'eternal' means more than 'non-
temporal' since what makes God eternal is the very identity of God's essence 
with existence, such that God alone is in full possession of life and so can 
properly be said to be the cause of everything's existing (351). The result, 
then, is a creator, free because eminently personal (Ch. IX), yet "purged ... of 
the implications of 'individuality' to which Hindu and Buddhist rightly ob-
ject" (370) by a "metaphysical perspective which ... considers the conditions 
of temporal existence itself, and not the conditions of rational thinking, as 
internal to any proper theology" (338). 
That same perspective "secures the rejection of deistic, 'strong pre-
destinationist,' and Platonic models of eternity and personhood" (333) by 
adopting the "via negativa [which insists] that God should be differently 
related to his effects than any other possible cause to its effects and that He 
should possess His nature in a different way from any other possible being" 
(353)-i.e., simply and identically. Joined to a non-dualist account of action, 
this means that "the eternal God .. .is at one and the same time the one whose 
breath (spirit, pneuma, or ruah) enlivens, energizes, and gives vigor and 
existence to all things, immediate within them" (357)-since "the agent does 
what happens [in such away] that the time of the doing is the time of the 
happening so that God's acting will not be in eternity but in time" (135), 
since "what is done by God is the existing and the continued existing of things 
that exist" (20). Moreover, this immediacy of God's presence to creation, tied 
as it is to the reality of time, nicely finesses "foreknowledge" questions, since 
whatever does not exist cannot be present to a knower either. The need to 
attribute such a knowledge to God at once betrays a category mistake (re. 
time/eternity) as well as places both creator and creature in a theological bind, 
as we shall see. 
Braine's arguments are designed explicitly to culminate in a creator: not a 
demiurge, which he implies is the furthest one can reach with a "platonist" 
or rationalist perspective, which elevates conceptual possibilities above the 
actuality of existing things; nor a sovereign being conceived "alongside" the 
world in which we live, "imagined as if He made plans and acted in the 
manner of a finite person" (327). With such a one, "we seem to be forced 
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into a choice between 'strong predestination ism ' and a coeval interdependent 
demiurge." So the metaphysical efforts to think an incomposite (or simple) 
being, whose uniqueness is rooted in that negative first-level assertion (168-
73), and to do so from an analysis of existing things which leads one to 
recognize their existential composition, promises a rich theological payoff. 
Yet here one must attend to Braine's explicit "contrast between a rationalist 
metaphysics attempting to build ... on certain univocal general principles 
bestraddling all subject-matters uniformly and an Aristotelian metaphysics 
utilizing structurally interrelated sets of analogous concepts" (210). What is 
at stake here is a crucial difference in the way one approaches human knowl-
edge of generality: is it "exhibited primarily in judgements about particular 
cases" (257), and so "realized in a spread of analogous applications of 
principle" or is it expressed "in some single univocal principle" (262)? 
Braine, with Aquinas (213-19) and Wittgenstein, comes down decisively for 
the first, while "platonists," who play the lasting foil for his sustained argu-
ment, line up with Scotus and Leibniz (263) on the other side, carrying with 
them (I would suggest) all too many graduate students who are introduced 
into professional philosophy by way of -isms rather than by way of examples 
and careful consideration of the context and point of diverse philosophical 
arguments. In that respect, Braine's manner of proceeding, rigorous as it is, 
asks more than following its tight reasoning; or rather, the upshot of allowing 
oneself to follow the arguments will be a challenge to settled perspectives 
about philosophical argument itself. That is, I take it, the import of his 
insistence on the primacy of first-order over second-order considerations 
(225n.), and of an "a posteriori approach which considers the conditions of 
temporal existence" (378) over various a priori approaches associated with 
"platonism" and identified with Scotus. Braine shows better than anyone I 
know just how crucial such a difference is for philosophical theology, and 
since that difference cuts so deep, just how relevant other parts of philosophy 
are to executing a philosophy of religion which will be adequate to the 
demands of a theology faithful to the newness of Christian revelation-to say 
nothing of the newness of Jewish or Muslim faith as well. 
Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age, by 
Sallie McFague. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987. Pp. xv and 224. 
JOSEPH RUNZO, Claremont Graduate School and 
Chapman College, California. 
This is an important book. Addressing some of the most trenchant, current 
issues in philosophical theology, it offers an articulate and interesting expo-
sition of "metaphorical theology" which not only challenges traditional theo-
